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DICTA

Constitutional Law-Fourteenth Amendment Due ProcessInvoluntary Blood Taking as Judged by a Socio-Legal Court
By DWIGHT D. MURPHEY
A former student at Colorado University and the New York University
Graduate School of Business Administration, Mr. Murphey is a student at
the University of Denver College of Law and Note Editor of DICTA.

After an automobile accident, a state highway patrolman directed a physician to take blood from the arm of the unconscious
driver for use in an alcoholic content test. The smell of alcohol on
the driver's breath and an almost empty liquor bottle found in the
car had indicated that the driver had been drinking. The result of
the blood analysis was used to secure his conviction for involuntary manslaughter in a New Mexico court. No appeal was taken.
A subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus was denied.
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, by a 6-3 decision,
affirmed on the grounds (1) that the right against admission of
illegally obtained evidence under the fourth and fifth amendments
to the United States Constitution is not enforceable against the
states as a generative principle of the Bill of Rights, and (2) that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was not violated inasmuch as the taking of blood without the petitioner's consent
was not conduct sufficiently offensive or brutal as to deprive him
of fundamental constitutional guarantees. In two dissenting opinions, it was objected that such an act was shocking to the conscience
and hence unlawful. Breithaupt v. Abram, 77 Sup. Ct. 408, 412, 413
(1957).
The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution have
never been held to be restrictions upon the states.' Nor has it been
held that the specific enumeration of a right among the Bill of
Rights is alone sufficient to make that guarantee applicable against
the states under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.2 Rather, this clause encompasses only those rights which, regardless of whether they are explicitly mentioned in the Bill of
Rights, are found through a long history of 4judicial inclusion and
exclusion" to be fundamental to a free society.
Among the restrictions thus excluded from the meaning of the
due process clause is the fifth amendment guarantee against compulsory self-incrimination in a criminal proceeding.5 In federal
prosecutions illegally obtained evidence is inadmissable under the
interpretations given the fourth and fifth amendments.6 The states,
however, are free to act as they choose in this regard, and the admissibility of evidence obtained by unreasonable search and seizure
is a matter to be determined in each state by its own law.'
If, on the one hand, a state forbids admission of illegally obtained evidence, its use violates the state's law and hence might be
I Barron v. Baltimore, 10 U. S. (7 Pet.) 464 (1833).
'Polka v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516 (1884).
3 Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 104 (1877).
4 Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U. S. 312 (1926); Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366 (1898); Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U. S. 714 (1877).
$Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908) (leading case); Adamson v. California, 332 U. S.
46 (1947); Polka v. Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937).
6 Weeks v. United States, 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
7
Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 38, Appendix, Table 1 (1949).
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considered a violation of due process. Thus the Wisconsin Supreme
Court recently held that the taking of blood for an alcoholic content test while a person was unconscious after an accident, and the
subsequent use of the test results against him in a trial for negligent homicide, was, in this manner, unconstitutional both under the
state constitution8 and the fourteenth amendment due process
clause.0
A state may, on the other hand, follow one of two
other possible policies. It may, like Colorado, 10 permit the admission of such
evidence under its law," or it may mix its policy by only partially
allowing the use of illegally obtained evidence. 2 In a state where
the first course prevails, and sometimes in a state of the second
type, the defendant in a criminal proceeding has no recourse to the
Federal Constitution to secure the exclusion of this sort of evidence
unless it can be shown that some part of the state's action has run
counter to one or more of the fundamental rights
brought under
13
the due process clause by judicial interpretation.
The New Mexico court has interpreted that state's constitutional provisions as allowing the admission of illegally obtained evidence."4 The United States Supreme Court in the Breithaupt case
15 (1911).
followed the well-established rules just mentioned in holding that
under these circumstances no error was present in the use of the
evidence.
However, it is also established that any prejudicial act by government which is of such a nature as to shock the community's
sense of fairness is outside due process of law,' and whether such
an act had been perpetrated was the primary issue in the Breithaupt case. Personal sensibilities are not the criteria for this test
unless they are generally shared by the population. In the Court's
opinion, due process is an evolutionary concept changing as the
people's practices and thinking change."' In each case, however, the
SWis. Const. art. 1, § 8 (1870).
Wisconsin v. Kroenig, 274 Wis. 266, 79 N. W.2d 810 (1956).
'°Massantonio v. People, 77 Colo. 392, 236 Pac. 1019 (1925).
"Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U. S. 25, 35, Appendix, Table E (1949).
" See, e. g.,Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U. S. 545 (1954).
1Ibid. See note 3 supra.
14State v. Dillon, 34 N. M. 366, 281 Pac. 474 (1929), construing N. M. Const. art. 2, § § 7, 10,
13 Rochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952); Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U. S. 278 (1936).
i"[D]ue process is not measured by the yardstick of personal reaction or the sphygmogram of
the most sensitive person, but by the whole community sense of 'decency and fairness' that has
been woven by common experience into the fabric of acceptable conduct." 77 Sup. Ct. at 410.
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private right involved must be weighed against the interest of government in performing its functions."
This point of view is to be distinguished from earlier positions
taken by the Court. Although the due process clause has long been
taken to include a largely undefined body of basic rights, 18 the
establishment of a sociological test for inclusion and exclusion is
philosophically opposed to those conceptions of the law which hold
that law is to be immutable except as it is changed by legislative
action and that rights are to be secure against shifts in majority
opinion. Breithaupt represents the "modern" trend. The "traditional" view was perhaps best expressed by the late Justice Sutherland
when he cautioned that although the law is inclusive of all new
situations to which it applies, it must not be taken to mean something which it did not mean when written. 19 The "modern" position
considers the major premises of the law as evolutionary. 20 The "traditional" legal philosophy holds that only the factual situations,
the minor premises, may evolve without the action of the properly
constituted legislative organs. Whether this conflict involves a difference of opinion as to the outcome of the Breithaupt case under
the two conceptions of the law is, of course, speculative. It is quite
possible to reach the same conclusion through different lines of
reasoning.
The Court in the principal case, however, relied upon the discovery of criteria by induction, which is-under the Court's present
doctrine-the only avenue of approach open. It is significant that
the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Frankfurter, placed much
emphasis upon the extent of blood sampling in the United States
both in general medical practice and under the laws requiring blood
tests prior to marriage.2 ' The Court also appeared to stress the degree of the subject's physical exertion in opposing the violation of
his body as a test of considerable importance, 2' probably with the
view that this is relevant to the manner by which the general community would react to bloodtaking. In a prior case in which the
man had struggled violently to avoid stomach-pumping, the Court
held that the public conscience had been offended. 23 On the other
factual extreme, a California case held that no offensive act occurred where blood was taken from a driver's arm while he was
unconscious after an automobile accident. 24 However, in the last
1777 Sup. Ct. at 412.

uTwining v. New Jersey, 211 U. S. 78 (1908); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 176 (1899).
Is "[T]he meaning of the Constitution does not change with the ebb and flow of economic
events. We frequently are told in more general words that the Constitution must be construed in
the light of the present. If by that it is meant that the Constitution is made up of living words that
apply to every new condition which they include, the statement is quite true. But to say, if that be
intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when written-that
is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would have applied then-is to rob that
instrument of the essential element which continues it in force as the people have made it until they,
and not their official agents, have made it otherwise.
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300
U. 5. 379, 402 (1937) (dissent).
20See, e. g., Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U. S.'483 (1954).
21"The blood test procedure has become routine in our everyday life. It is a ritual for those
going into the military service as well as those applying for marriage licenses. Many colleges require
such tests before permitting entrance." 77 Sup. Ct. at 410.
2 "[T]he absence of conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the taking
a violation of a constitutional right." 77 Sup. Ct. at 410 (emphasis supplied). See also the interpretation of the Court's opinion given in the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Warren, who said: "The
Court's opinion suggests that an invasion is 'brutal' or 'offensive' only if the police use force to
overcome a suspect's resistance." Id. at 413.
mRochin v. California, 342 U. S. 165 (1952).
"People v. Haeussler, 41 Col. 2d 252, 260 P.2d 8 (1953).
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mentioned case, the blood sample was also needed for typing in
order that the injured driver might receive a transfusion. The Breithaupt case lay between these two cases in terms of the violence
done, and in none of the blood-taking cases mentioned here was a
struggle present. It will be interesting to see what the Court will
decide if ever a case arises pertaining to a state's right to use evidence obtained by a hypodermic withdrawal of blood from a conscious and strongly resisting defendant.
An additional constitutional issue involved in these cases seems
now to be settled. The statutory provision that a high blood alcohol
content is to be taken as presumptive of intoxication has been upheld against the contention that it established an unconstitutional
presumption of guilt.2 5 Unquestionably, the alcoholic content of

blood has a strong, rational connection with the fact of intoxication.
Several criticisms of Breithaupt might be offered. Primarily it
must be recognized that the view, discussed above, that the content of liberties is to shift with the changing feelings of the people
is, in itself, inconsistent with the Rule of Law, and therefore inconsistent with perhaps the most fundamental concept of a free society.
Each man's protection against the misuse of power should not depend upon the vicissitudes of his neighbors' opinions. If there is to
be an evolution of the law it is better that the rights of the people
should always be broadly construed and the powers of government
narrowly confined. The "public interest" to enforce a particular law
should never be held to outweigh the interest which the people have
at stake in the protection of private rights if substantial methods of
law enforcement exist in the alternative. The states are not so destitute of means to enforce traffic laws that they must puncture the
unwilling bodies of their citizens. In the instant case, for example,
other evidence was present, including a near-empty liquor bottle
and the smell of alcohol on the driver's breath. The state may well
have been able to obtain testimony by persons who had witnessed
his drinking. It can hardly be said that there is a paucity of alternative proofs in cases involving overt acts which may be seen by
others and which often give rise to abundant circumstantial
evidence.
25 State v. Childress, 78 Ariz. 1,274 P.2d 333 (1954).

